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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
more than thirty years old. The proponents of the act, while
anticipating serious objections, nevertheless, felt certain that its
constitutionality would be ultimately upheld.26 As early as 1958,
one commentator predicted that although the retroactive aspect of
the statute would be attacked as a taking without due process, the
opportunity to avoid the taking by the simple act of recording would
be sufficient to assure the statute's validity.
27
It is to be noted that the Court has ruled only on that portion
of the law which refers to deeds creating possibilities of reverter
executed prior to 1931. The entire statute has not yet been in-
validated, but in view of the reasoning in the instant case it is
doubtful whether the Court will uphold the statute as it applies to
those interests created between 1931 and 1961 (the effective cut-off
date of the statute). The prospective provisions of the statute ap-
pear to be safe, however, and thus, possibilities of reverter created
after 1961 will fail unless recorded.
That restrictions can have valid and worthwhile objectives is
not denied, and to condemn all restrictions upon land would be
rather short-sighted. On the other hand, there are many restric-
tions which serve no beneficial purposes and which have been for-
gotten by the owners of the land and by the holders of the rever-
sionary interests. It is apparent that we should distinguish between
antiquated restrictions and those which retain a useful purpose.
A recording act is a valid solution since it allows destruction of the
former upon the failure to record and allows the retention of the
latter by the recordation of an intention to preserve.
TORTS- FIRST RECOGNITION OF "WRONGFUL LIFE" AS VALID
CAUSE OF ACTION. - Due to the state's alleged negligence, a female
incompetent was sexually assaulted while confined in a mental in-
stitution. The plaintiff, conceived as a result of the attack, claimed
tort damages primarily for suffering "the stigma of illegitimacy."
Ruling solely on the sufficiency of the pleading, the New York
Court of Claims held that the infant had a valid cause of action
against the state. Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d
953 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
At common law, life began, from a legal point of view, when
the infant stirred in its mother's womb.' Gradually, a child en ventre
26 1951 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAw REVISION CoMM'N RE'. (B)
32. 27Supra note 18, at 1196.
11 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 129.
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sa vwr gained recognition as a human being for purposes of in-
heritance 2 and in criminal cases.3 However, in 1884, Judge Holmes
refused to allow a tort recovery to a child who had suffered pre-
natal injuries, reasoning that the child at the time of the injury
was a part of the mother, and, therefore, that she alone should
recover for any damage that was done to her child.4
After 1900, various dissenting opinions indicated a trend towards
allowing a remedy to a child who had suffered tortious injury while in
the womb of its mother.5 In 1933, the issue was squarely presented
in a Canadian case." The court not only recognized that both
parents might be entitled to damages as a result of pre-natal in-
juries suffered by their child, but it also approved the child's in-
dependent right of action, stating, "there is a residuum of injury
for which compensation cannot be had save at the suit of the child." '
The major breakthrough in the United States occurred thirteen
years later, in Bonbrest v. Kota.s The plaintiff there claimed dam-
ages for injuries sustained at the time of her birth by reason of
alleged professional malpractice. Denying the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, the court held that since the child was
viable at the time of the injury, it had standing to maintain the
action.
In a subsequent New York case, 10 the court traced the develop-
ment of the concept of legal separability. It announced that "separ-
2 Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige 35 (N.Y. 1830).
3 3 CoxE, THIn INSTITuTE 50 (1797).4 Dietrich v. Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884). The denial of the
cause of action in tort to the child was predominantly founded on three
reasons: (a) no duty was owed to the child as he was not in "existence"
at the time of the injury; (b) the difficulty of proving a causal con-
nection between the negligence and the damage thereby resulting to the
child; and, (c) fear of fictitious claims. PaossER, Toms § 56 (3d ed.
1964). See generally Comment, 3 DR PAUL L. REv. 257 (1954).
5E.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 369, 56 N.E. 638, 640
(1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting); Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d
489 (Ct Err. & App. 1942) (Brogen, CJ., dissenting); Drobner v. Peters,
232 N.Y. 220, 224, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (1921) (Cardozo, J., dissenting
without opinion).
6 Moatreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] Can. Sup. Ct 456, [1933] 4
D.L.R. 337.
7 Id. at 464, 4 D.L.R. at 345.
865 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
9The concept of attributing a separate legal existence to a fetus only
if it was viable at the time of the injury presented obvious problems. For
example, there was no medical way of determining the amount of time
necessary for a fetus to attain viability. In addition, the non-viable fetus
possessed the potential of being born in a normal condition if left un-
disturbed during its process of maturation. See Magnolia Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 358, 78 S.W.2d 944, 949 (1935).
See also Comment, 3 DE PAUL L. 1Ev. 257, 267 (1954).
"°Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't
1953).
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ability begins at conception," 11 and thus, for the first time, recog-
nized an infant's legal existence at the moment of its conception.
Other jurisdictions quickly adopted this theory.1
Prior to the instant case, Zepeda v. Zepeda 13 was the only
decision on record in which a child had sought to recover damages
from her natural father solely on the ground that she was illegiti-
mate. Although the court there conceded that the elements of a
wilful tort were set forth in the complaint, it was disturbed by the
fact that recognition of the claim would mean "the creation of a
new tort: a cause of action for wrongful life. . . ." 14 Therefore,
the court dismissed the complaint for failing to set forth a sufficient
and recognized cause of action.'15
Acknowledging the existence of a wrong, the instant Court,
on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action, ruled only that the action for "wrongful life" was maintain-
able. The proposition that novelty should deter recognition of a
new cause of action was rejected,16 and it was stated that the plain-
tiff could maintain an action based on the stigma of illegitimacy,
which was itself a substantial wrong..7  The similarity between
Zepeda and the instant case is apparent. In both, the cause of
action is in tort for what may be called "wrongful life." In Zepeda,
however, plaintiff was suing her natural father, while here, the
suit is against the state for its negligence in the care and protection
of plaintiff's mother.
Recognition of this new "wrong" comes at a time when illegiti-
mates are more favorably viewed than ever before. At common
law, an illegitimate child was called filius nullius, son of no man,
and was denied many legal rights.' 8  More recently, a compassionate
11 Id. at 544, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697.12 E.g, Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d
727 (1956) (action was permitted where embryo was injured in sixth week
of development); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691(1961) (mother pregnant for one month at time of injury).
'341 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945(1964).
14 Id. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
15 The court listed several reasons for refusing to allow the cause of actionbased on "wrongful life": (1) numerous suits by persons born with hereditary
defects, or racial disadvantages; (2) the difficulty of placing this alleged
tort in traditional categories; and, (3) allowance of the suit would be
"judicial lawmaking."
16Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 826, 260 N.Y.S2d 953, 955 (Ct. CI.
1965).
17 Id. at 829, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 958.18 People v. Moczek, 407 Ill. 373, 380, 95 N.E.2d 428, 432 (1950). In
1576, the first legislation pertaining to illegitimates was enacted, relieving
local parishes of the burden of supporting them. See Note, 23 BRooxLu'v
L. REv. 80, 82 (1957). As late as 1917, New York declared that illegitimates
were not favored by the law. See Bell v. Terry & Tench Co., 177 App.
Div. 123, 125, 163 N.Y. Supp. 733, 735 (3d Dep't 1917).
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sense of social justice has brought about beneficial legislation, easing
many of the illegitimate's former handicaps.19 However, while
reforms are progressing, the stigma of illegitimacy remains a very
real source of personal injury. In Zepeda, the court said, "laws
cannot temper the cruelty of those who hurl the epithet 'bastard'
nor ease the bitterness in him who hears it, knowing it to be
true." 20
Narrowly construing the holding of Williams, it would appear
that a cause of action in favor of the child would exist only where
the state's negligence is the proximate cause of the "wrongful life."
However, the Court stated, by way of dicta, that the decision
reached in Zepeda "deviated from its logical sequence when it con-
cluded that the cause of action had to be dismissed," 21 after con-
cluding that a wrong had been committed. The inference seems
irrefutable that if the Zepeda case were to be decided by the Court
in Williams, the decision, by a parity of reasoning, would give an
illegitimate child a cause of action for "wrongful life" against its
natural father, and possibly against its unwed mother, assuming she
had consented to the illicit act.
2 2
19 E.g., N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LAw §83(14) provides for the right of an
illegitimate child to inherit from its mother under certain circumstances;
N.Y. Dom. RE. LAw § 145(3) permits bastards to become legitimatized
by the subsequent marriage of the natural parents; N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw
§ 4135(1) permits the illegitimate to receive a birth certificate that will not
indicate that he was born out of wedlock; N.Y. FAm. CT. Acr § 512(a)
states that the phrase "child born out of wedlock" shall apply to a child
who is begotten and born outside lawful matrimony.
20Zepeda v. Zepeda, supra note 13, at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857.
21 Williams v. State, supra note 16, at 830, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
22 Such a decision would not be contrary to present New York public
policy. In Zepeda v. Zepeda, supra note 13, the illegitimate's action was
based partially on the father's promise to marry the mother, which
induced the intercourse. However, the illegitimate's action in the instant
case, sounding entirely in tort, could be maintained without alleging any
pre-marital agreement and, therefore, would not run afoul of the pro-
hibition of such suits. N.Y. Civ. RiGHTs LAW §§ 80-84, as amended, N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 333. The corollary problem of damages is significant
in this context. "When injuries . . . leave the realm of the tangible world
courts understandably have difficulty in establishing principles of law
calculated to assure substantial justice." McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort
Liability in New York, 24 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 1 (1949).
In Williams, the plaintiff's action was directed against the state because
of the latter's negligence. Thus, proof of damages f6i'med an essential
part of the plaintiff's cause of action. Generally, such compensatory damages
are determined by comparing the plaintiff's present condition with his position
prior to the tort. Here, since plaintiff's previous "state" was one of non-
existence, this standard is inapplicable. The jury must therefore determine
the extent to which this particular child will be damaged by the stigma
of illegitimacy during its natural life. In this respect, the computation of
damages will be speculative, based on an illusionary norm, comparable with
the damages in wrongful death actions.
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While in Williams the Court recognized the existence of a
tort, it did not dispose of the multifarious problems inherent in,
but left unanswered by, its decision. While these difficulties were
not proper areas for judicial consideration, the true effect of the
Court's decision cannot be evaluated without discussing them. For
example, there were 20,223 illegitimate births in New York in
1964.23 Theoretically, an equal number of "wrongful birth" actions
are possible. Increasing litigation in this area would cause con-
siderably more confusion than already exists in our congested court
system. Secondly, the difficulty of determining damages is ap-
parent where the plaintiff alleges injury arising as a result of the
"stigma of illegitimacy." Query how the increasing proportion of
illegitimacy might abrogate the so-called "stigma" and thereby re-
duce the injury. Furthermore, in New York, a child conceived
through the aid of an artificial insemination device (A.I.D.) is
illegitimate. Is it not then possible to hypothesize a suit by the
representative of such an illegitimate against the parents, even
though both parents had consented to conception through such a
device ? 24 Would such a child be entitled to maintain an action for
"wrongful life," the basis of the action being the "stigma of
illegitimacy?"
In striving for an effective solution to these problems, and
others of an analogous nature, it would seem that our present
judicial system is not geared to handle a task of such magnitude.
Rather than attempting to "revamp" our court system to meet this
challenge, it seems that a more desirable remedy would lie in the
creation of a specialized body to handle the matter. During the
past thirty years, administrative agencies have emerged as successful
legislative creations working in areas of specialization originally
In cases analogous to Zepeda, the plaintiff' has alternative remedies:
the action may be in negligence, in which situation the defendant's state of
mind would not be a factor; plaintiff may also alleje a 'prima facie tort,
i.e., the intentional performance of an 4ct producing injury, but not of such
a categorical nature as to fit a recognized cause of action. Proceeding
under the prima facie tort, plaintiff would also be allowed to recover ex-
emplary or punitive damages if the defendant's wrongdoing, in addition to
being deliberate, were shown to have been committed with a malicious or
fraudulent "motive.2
3 These figures were obtained by the author from the New York City
Dep't of Health, Bureau of Records & Statistics.
24Gursky v.. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411
(Sup. Ct 1963). See generally Biskind, Legitimacy of Children Born by
Artificial Insemination, 5 J. FA.. L. 39 (1965)., Artificial insemination
achieved through the use of the husband's semen is commonly referred
to as homologous insemination or A.I.H. In Gursky, a third party's semen
was introduced, thereby causing heterological insemination or A.I.D. It is




within the purview of the judicial process.25  The adoption of a
specialized agency in this area would therefore seem appropriate.
If endowed with liberal powers of discretion, such an agency
could evaluate each "wrongful life" claim on a sociological as well
as a legal basis, thus assuring substantial justice to all interested
parties.
25 See generally DAvis, ADmrNismMvA LAW §§ 1.01-09 (1959).
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